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I. INTRODUCTION
In this article, I consider the propriety of an indictment of a person
who was subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury at which the person
invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination on any
questions relevant to the investigation and where the government knew
that this person would assert the privilege. In Part I, I explore the prose-
cutor's power to secure evidence and present it the grand jury. In Part II,
I describe how the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination limits the prosecutor's power to secure evidence and pre-
sent it to the grand jury. In Part III, I apply the privilege to a situation
where a prosecutor knows that the person will invoke the privilege and
refuse to testify, yet still forces the person to exercise her privilege in
front of the grand jury which later indicts her.
I conclude that because of the inherent prejudice, if a person in-
formed the government of her intent to invoke her Fifth Amendment
privilege, then any indictment handed down by a grand jury that person-
ally observed this person invoke this privilege must be dismissed. A con-
trary rule undermines the Fifth Amendment privilege by allowing a
prosecutor to force a person to invoke the privilege in front of the grand
jury, thus raising the presumption of guilt in the grand jurors' minds
while concomitantly presenting an unnecessary opportunity for prosecu-
torial harassment, imposing an unnecessary burden on the witness and
potentially causing unnecessary embarrassment, all while wasting grand
jurors' time.'
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I. See infra Part V.
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If a person raises these issues and eventually brings her case to the
United States Supreme Court, the Court may approve of the dismissal of
such an indictment, without prejudice, to deter the government from such
actions in the future.
II. THE POWER TO SUBPOENA TO A GRAND JURY
A. The Federal Grand Jury Serves As an Arm of the Prosecutor
Federal prosecutors can issue subpoenas at their discretion.2 Rule
17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure guides the prosecutor dur-
ing the subpoena process.3 Under Rule 17, a subpoena may order any
person to testify under oath at a certain time and place.4 Prosecutors issue
these orders by filling out blank subpoenas already signed by the court.5
Prosecutors are empowered to issue subpoenas by their connection to a
federal grand jury. 6 The grand jury has been defined as the following:
A jury of inquiry who are summoned and returned by the sheriff to
each session of the criminal courts, and whose duty is to receive
complaints and accusations in criminal cases, hear the evidence
adduced on the part of the state, and find bills of indictment in cases
where they are satisfied a trial ought to be had.... This is called a"grand jury" because it comprises a greater number of jurors than
the ordinary trial jury or "petit jury." At common law, a grand jury
consisted of not less than 12 nor more than 23 men .... If the grand
jury determines that probable cause [to indict] does not exist, it
returns a "no bill." It is an accusatory body and its function does not
include a determination of guilt.7
2. See H. Richard Uviller, Symposium: The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion
in a Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1705 (2000).
3. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17.
4. See generally I SARA SUN BEALE & WILLIAM C. BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW AND PRAC-
TICE §§ 6:1-01 to 6:0-3 (1986).
5. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide as follows:
A subpoena must state the court's name and the title of the proceeding, include the seal of
the court, and command the witness to attend and testify at the time and place the sub-
poena specifies. The clerk must issue a blank subpoena-signed and sealed-to the party
requesting it, and that party must fill in the blanks before the subpoena is served.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(a).
6. Glenn A. Guarino, Annotation, What Actions of United States Attorney Constitute Usurpa-
tion ofAuthority of Federal Grand Jury, Thus Warranting Exclusion of Evidence Obtained Thereby,
65 A.L.R. Fed. 957 §1 (1984 & Supp. 2003).
7. Jack Kaufman, Section 1983: Absolute Immunity for Pretrial Police Testimony, 16 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 647, 688 n. 179 (1988) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 768 (5th ed. 1979)). Grand
jury hearings, however, are always ex parte proceedings. The only persons present are jurors, attor-
neys for the prosecution, witnesses, a recorder, and interpreters (if required). Grand jury witnesses
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The prosecutor, who must be duly appointed,' is not supposed to
usurp the power of the grand jury when subpoenaing people to a grand
jury.9 The grand jury is composed in a regulated manner to meet consti-
tutional requirements. 10 Courts often note that the government cannot use
the grand jury solely as a discovery device."1 But the prosecutor's power
over the grand jury is great enough that the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit described grand juries as "for all practical
purposes an investigative and prosecutorial arm of the executive branch
of government."' 2 Similarly, in United States v. Kleen Laundry & Clean-
ers, Inc.,13 the court noted that "the grand jury's independence in the
criminal justice system has declined with the increasing complexity of
crime and the growth of the role of prosecutors, professional police, and
investigative forces."1 4 The Kleen court explained that Assistant United
States Attorneys now are the ones who gather the evidence for the grand
do not have a right to counsel while testifying, and defendants have no right to attend their grand
jury hearing. Id. (internal citations omitted).
8. Keri L. Bowles, Thirty-First Annual Review of Criminal Procedure. Preliminary Proceed-
ings: Grand Jury, 90 GEO. L.J. 1305, 1310 (2002) ("The Attorney General, or any attorney author-
ized by the Attorney General, may conduct grand jury proceedings in the federal courts.").
9. In an annotation regarding a prosecutor's authority in a federal grand jury proceeding, Glenn
A. Guarino wrote the following:
It has been said that one of the most valuable functions of the grand jury is to stand be-
tween the prosecutor and the accused, that is, to protect the citizen against unfounded ac-
cusations, whether they come from the government or are prompted by partisan passion
or private enmity. It is important, therefore, that the integrity and autonomy of the grand
jury's proceedings be maintained intact, and that the prosecutor who brings evidence be-
fore the grand jury not be allowed to usurp any of the grand jury's authority.
Guarino, supra note 6, at 958 (footnote omitted).
10. See Bowles, supra note 8, at 1305-09.
11. See United States v. Sells Eng'g Inc., 463 U.S. 418 (1983). The Court stated the following:
If prosecutors in a given case knew that their colleagues would be free to use the materi-
als generated by the grand jury for a civil case, they might be tempted to manipulate the
grand jury's powerful investigative tools to root out additional evidence useful in the civil
suit, or even to start or continue a grand jury inquiry where no criminal prosecution
seemed likely. Any such use of grand jury proceedings to elicit evidence for use in a civil
case is improper per se.
Id. at 432 (citing Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 683-84 (1958)); United States v. Wadlington,
233 F.3d 1067, 1074 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 109 (2d Cir. 1998);
United States v. Alred, 144 F.3d 1405, 1413-14 (11 th Cir. 1998); In re Grand Jury Proceedings No.
92-4, 42 F.3d 876, 878 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Breitkreutz, 977 F.2d 214, 217 (6th Cir.
1992); United States v. Santucci, 674 F.2d 624, 628, 632 (7th Cir. 1982); Beverly v. United States,
468 F.2d 732, 742-44 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Star, 470 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1972); Durbin
v. United States, 221 F.2d 520, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1954); United States v. Kleen Laundry & Cleaners,
Inc., 381 F. Supp. 519, 523 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); United States v. Thomas, 320 F. Supp. 527 (D.D.C.
1970); In re Nat'l Window Glass Workers, 287 F. 219 (N.D. Ohio 1922).
12. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85, 90 (3d Cir. 1973).
13. 381 F. Supp. at 519.
14. Id. at 521.
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jury, call and examine witnesses, present documents, explain the law,
sum up the evidence, and request an indictment.1 5 The court also noted
that "the conduct of the prosecutor in obtaining an indictment is virtually
unreviewable,"' 6 and upheld the prosecutor's action by rejecting the ar-
gument that "the use of the power on behalf of, but without direction
from, a grand jury results in an invalid indictment which should be dis-
missed and in illegally obtained evidence which should be suppressed."' 7
Citing numerous cases' 8 and the language of Rule 17,19 the Kleen court
held that the prosecutor had the power to independently issue subpoe-
nas.20
The prosecutor's power to use a grand jury was viewed expansively
in United States v. Santucci,2 1 where the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit upheld a prosecutor's subpoena of suspects to a
non-existent grand jury.22 The Santucci court claimed that "[t]he defen-
dants are themselves in part responsible for the absence of grand jury
involvement" and noted that the defendants could have tried to appear
before this imaginary grand jury. Perhaps pointing to the futility of a
defendant's appearance at an empty grand jury room before an imaginary
grand jury, the court explained that "[e]ven if a grand jury had not been
15. Id.
16. Id. (citing 8 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 6.04 at 6-47 (2d
ed. 1973)).
17. Id.
18. Id. (citing, among others, United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407, 413 (1920) ("United
States district attorney ... has the power to present ... information"); Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 361, 372 (1910) (production of documents without testimony may be required).
19. Id. at 522 ("Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which governs the issu-
ance of subpoenas in all criminal proceedings in general and in grand jury proceedings in particular,
lends statutory authority to the prosecutor's role.").
20. Id. at 521.
21. 674 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1982).
22. Id. at 625, 632 (in a case which had not been opened before the grand jury where subpoe-
nas were not sought or obtained from any grand jury, the court held that "the United States Attorney
may select witnesses, obtain blank subpoenas to be completed and served on witnesses without
consultation with the grand jury," and that "[w]e see no constitutional violation; we see no egregious
conduct by the government"); see also United States v. Smith, 687 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1982) (follow-
ing Santucci). But see Durbin v. United States, 221 F.2d 520, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1954); In re Melvin,
546 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1976) (holding that the trial court's order requiring attendance of a person
who the government lacked probable cause to arrest outside grand jury room at proceeding not under
the grand jury's supervision went "considerably beyond the routine issuance of subpoenas and other
actions in which the United States Attorney has proceeded without specific direction of the grand
jury," and labeled this as "a major intrusion upon personal liberty," and a power of such magnitude
in the United States Attorney was unacceptable); United States v. O'Kane, 439 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.
Fla. 1977).
23. Santucci, 674 F.2d at 632.
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sitting at that time the subpoenas could have been continued." In sum,
case law makes it clear that "[a]lthough grand jury subpoenas are occa-
sionally discussed as if they were the instrumentalities of the grand jury,
they are in fact almost universally instrumentalities of the United States
Attorney's office or of some other investigative or prosecutorial depart-
ment of the executive branch., 25 Furthermore, "[w]hile there are some
limits on the investigative powers of the grand jury, there are few if any
other forums in which a governmental body has such relatively unregu-
lated power to compel other persons to divulge information or present
evidence.,
26
The grand jury has evolved to become an instrumentality of the
prosecutor. Notably, the grand jury is not "subject to the direction of the
court's directions and orders with respect to the exercise of its essential
functions. 27 The prosecutor has ultimate power to guide the grand jury
subpoena and indictment processes. This is an awesome power for the
following three reasons: (1) A grand jury investigation may be triggered
by tips or rumors heard by prosecutors; 28 (2) a grand jury investigation
cannot be enjoined;29 and (3) the grand jury's right to inquire into possi-
ble offenses is unrestrained by technical or evidentiary rules. 30 For these
reasons, the danger is that in the hands of an unsavory or overzealous
prosecutor,31 abuses of the grand jury may occur.
24. Id.
25. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85, 90 (3d Cir. 1973).
26. United States v. Sells Eng'g Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 433 (1983) (citation omitted).
27. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 238 F.2d 713, 719 (4th Cir. 1956); see also
United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992) ("[T]he grand jury is an institution separate from
the courts .... In fact, the whole theory of its function is that it belongs to no branch of the institu-
tional Government, serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people.").
28. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 701 (1972); see also United States v. R. Enters., Inc.,
498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991) ("[T]he grand jury 'can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is
being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not."') (quoting United States v.
Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950)).
29. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 525 F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1975).
30. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974).
31. In his dissent in Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 321-22 (1997) (holding that a symbolic
"commitment to the struggle against drug abuse" cannot justify drug testing all candidates for public
office without showing some problems of drug abuse among such candidates), Justice Brandeis put
it this way:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Govern-
ment's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion
of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious en-
croachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.
Id. at 322 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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B. The Court Will Punish Failure to Comply with a Subpoena
If a person refuses to comply with a lawful subpoena, the govern-
ment can seek contempt charges. 32 Only a court has the authority to pun-
ish a failure to comply with a subpoena; 33 however, through a citizen's
duty to help the government enforce the laws, the prosecutor who sought
a subpoena can assist the court in bringing contempt charges.34
Two types of contempt charges can be imposed against someone
who fails to comply with a subpoena: civil and criminal, each with a dif-
ferent aim. A contempt charge is civil or criminal based "on the 'charac-
ter and purpose' of the sanction involved. 35 A contempt proceeding is
civil if the sanction "is remedial, and for the benefit of the complain-
ant,''36 and this "benefit" can accrue indefinitely. 37 A contempt proceed-
ing is criminal if the sentence is "punitive, to vindicate the authority of
the court." 38 With civil contempt charges a person is only punished until
he complies with a subpoena or until the grand jury has been dis-
charged.39 But with criminal contempt, punishment can be imposed long
32. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17 (g).
33. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 48 (1992) (noting that a grand jury cannot compel
the appearance of a witness and the production of evidence, and must appeal to the constituting court
for compulsion); see also 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2004) (describing the civil contempt power of federal
courts); § 402 (describing the criminal contempt power of federal courts); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 346
(observing that grand jury's subpoena power is not unlimited and indicating that a grand jury must
rely on a court to compel production of books, papers, documents, and the testimony of witnesses
under Rule 17).
34. In United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977), the court opined as follows:
The concept that citizens have a duty to assist in enforcement of the laws is at least in part
the predicate of Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 17, which clearly contemplates power in the dis-
trict courts to issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum to nonparty witnesses and to
hold noncomplying, nonparty witnesses in contempt. Of course we do not address the
question of whether and to what extent such a general duty may be legally enforced in the
diverse contexts in which it may arise.
Id. at 175 (italics in original) (citation omitted).
35. Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826-27 (1994).
36. Id.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (2004) (providing that a witness who refuses to testify may be con-
fined until he complies with the court's order, and the confinement may continue for the term of the
grand jury); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3331(a) (2004) (a grand jury's term is eighteen months unless an
order for discharge is entered earlier by the court); FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(g) (providing for a six-month
extension if in the "public interest"). If two years of imprisonment is not enough, once a grand jury's
term ends, a recalcitrant witness may be again called to testify before a subsequent grand jury.
38. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828; see also, e.g., Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385, 395 (1957)
(in rejecting the defendant's contention that there was no willful default and failure to comply under
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(g), the Court upheld his conviction for criminal contempt under FED. R. CRIM.
P. 42(b), holding that "the trial court had a sufficient basis for concluding that petitioner intention-
ally, and without 'adequate excuse,' defied the court" by failing to produce subpoenaed records).
39. See Michael J. Yaworsky, Annotation, Contempt: State Court's Power to Order Indefinite
Coercive Fine or Imprisonment to Exact Promise of Future Compliance with Court's Order-
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after a person has complied with a subpoena. 4 0 Lying to the court in re-
sponse to a subpoena exposes a person to potential criminal perjury
charges 4 1 as well as further criminal contempt charges. 42
When a witness refuses to comply with a subpoena directing him to
answer questions before a federal grand jury, even after receiving immu-
nity from the court, this act is seen as criminal contempt, not civil, and
therefore requires full criminal process 43 including notice of the charges,
a hearing, 44 and trial by jury.4 5 However, courts will not punish failure to
comply with a subpoena that impermissibly orders a person to appear in
the United States Attorney's office for interrogation.46 Similarly, a sub-
poena is unenforceable if it compels attendance at an unauthorized pro-
Anticipatory Contempt, 81 A.L.R. 4th 1008, § 2a (2003) ("[Clontempt consisting of present, ongoing
behavior may be dealt with by an indeterminate fine or term of imprisonment which continues in
effect until the violative behavior ceases; this is a coercive sanction."); see, e.g., Steven Labaton,
Clinton Ex-Partner Is Held in Contempt in Whitewater Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1996, at Al ("A
Federal judge held Susan McDougal in contempt today for refusing to answer a Whitewater prosecu-
tor's questions about whether her former business partner, Bill Clinton, had testified honestly at her
trial."); News Summary: Susan McDougal, In Transition, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1998, at A2 ("Susan
McDougal finished serving her 18-month Federal contempt sentence on Sunday for refusing to tes-
tify against President Clinton in the Whitewater case and she began serving a 2-year sentence for
bank fraud.").
40. Diana Lowndes, Note, Thirty-First Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: Trial: Authority
of the Trial Judge, 90 GEO. L.J. 1659, 1675-76 (2002) ("Criminal contempt sanctions are imposed to
vindicate the authority of the court and may be imposed even after the action in which the contempt
arose is terminated.") (footnote omitted).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2004) (perjury generally); § 1623 (false declarations before grand jury or
court).
42. J. A. Bock, Annotation, Perjury or False Swearing as Contempt, 89 A.L.R.2d 1258, §12
(1963) ("The commission of perjury or false swearing while testifying before a grand jury has fre-
quently been held or recognized as constituting a contempt of court."). But see In re Persico, 491
F.2d 1156, 1162 (2d Cir. 1974) (where the purpose of holding a person in contempt was to coerce
him to answer the grand jury's question and not to punish him for reprehensible conduct, he was
deemed only a recalcitrant witness whose "contempt was manifestly civil in character," to which the
summary procedure set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1826 was applicable, rather than the procedure for
criminal contempt that is set out in FED. R. CRiM. P. 42).
43. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828; see, e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137-38 (1954) (a con-
tempt proceeding does not comply with the due process requirement of an impartial tribunal under
circumstances where the judge presiding at the contempt hearing also served as a one-man grand
jury, out of which the contempt charges arose).
44. See generally Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965) (holding that a witness's refusal
to answer questions posed by the Federal District Court was not such an open and serious threat to
orderly judicial procedure as to justify summary contempt punishment under FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a)
without notice and an opportunity to be heard where the witness, having been granted immunity,
invoked the privilege against self incrimination).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 3691 (2004).
46. See Durbin v. United States, 221 F.2d 520, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (a grand jury subpoena
may not be used "as a compulsory administrative process of the United States Attorney's office ....
for the purpose of conducting [its] own inquisition."); United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972, 985
(3d Cir. 1976).
Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 28:239
ceeding.47 Additionally, a prosecutor must not threaten to use the court's
contempt power to force cooperation with an allegedly voluntary pro-
ceeding,48 nor take advantage of inherently coercive circumstances. 49
Although a federal prosecutor has the power to proceed with ac-
tions that arguably usurp the grand jury's power, the courts approving
these actions never found that such actions prejudiced any constitutional
rights.50 But does prejudice occur where a prosecutor brings a targeted
person before the grand jury although the prosecutor knows, or should
know, 51 that she will assert her privilege against self-incrimination? Does
prejudice exist where a grand jury indicts the person who appeared be-
fore it and invoked her rights? To make this determination, I explore the
nature of the protection given by the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination.
47. See United States v. Keen, 509 F.2d 1273 (6th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
48. See United States v. O'Kane, 439 F. Supp. 211 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
49. See United States v. Duncan, 570 F.2d 292, 293 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (holding that
the government carried its burden of showing the legality of evidence seized pursuant to a subpoena
to the grand jury):
Appellant testified he thought it would be better for him to cooperate, he cooperated vol-
untarily, he understood he did not have to talk with [the postal inspector] if he did not
want to and could stop talking and leave whenever he wished, he gave the written state-
ment willingly, and he volunteered to get the stamps for [the postal inspector].
Id. at 293; United States v. Smith, 687 F.2d 147, 152 n.2 (6th Cir. 1982) (finding that "the circum-
stances surrounding [the prosecutor's] suggestion of voluntarily producing the handwriting exem-
plars in lieu of Smith's scheduled grand jury appearance [were not] inherently coercive").
50. In United States v. Kleen Laundry & Cleaners, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 519 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), the
court explained as follows:
Our decision should not be viewed as a license for prosecutors to run roughshod over the
form of grand jury proceedings. In this case no prejudice whatsoever has been shown. No
intent by the prosecutor to circumvent the defendants' rights has been suggested....
Careless prosecutorial methods may so prejudice a defendant's rights so as to cause the
courts to raise once again the "sword and shield ofjustice." But this motion does not pro-
vide the occasion.
Id. at 524.
51. Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Inconsistency, Estoppel, and Due Process: Making the
Prosecution Get Its Story Straight, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1423, 1462 (2001) (citing Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972)) ("[L]ower courts have applied Giglio to attribute to the prosecution
knowledge on the part of other government employees."); see also id. at 1462 n.235 (citing United
States ex rel. Smith v. Fairman, 769 F.2d 386, 391-92 (7th Cir. 1985)) (although unknown to the
prosecution at trial, police knowledge of the inoperability of the gun allegedly used in the crime was
attributable to the prosecution as nondisclosure); United States v. Antone, 603 F.2d 566, 569-70 (5th
Cir. 1979) (although not material, information known to state investigators should be imputed to
federal prosecutors when a joint investigation takes place); United States v. Butler, 567 F.2d 885,
888-89 (9th Cir. 1978) (imputing knowledge to the prosecution of a "probable dismissal" deal with
eyewitness made by government agents); United States v. Morell, 524 F.2d 550, 555 (2d Cir. 1975)
(declaring that government agents, who knew of witness's role as a government informant and his
subsequent dealings with the government, were an "arm of the prosecutor").
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III. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT LIMITS PROSECUTORIAL POWER
It is a long-recognized principle that witnesses are "legally bound to
give testimony" when subpoenaed to the grand jury. The United States
Supreme Court, however, found limits to this principle in United States
v. Mandujano52 Anyone subpoenaed before a grand jury retains a privi-
lege against self-incrimination. 53 The Court explained that this limit
originates in the Fifth Amendment, which is "[t]he same Amendment
that establishes the grand jury[.],, 54
A plurality of the Court in Mandujano recognized as a "reality of
law enforcement" that it is unrealistic that "witnesses capable of provid-
ing useful information will be pristine pillars of the community untainted
by criminality. ' 55 The plurality noted that "[t]he obligation to appear is
no different for a person who may himself be the subject of the grand
jury inquiry[,],, 56 implying that even a putative defendant "can be re-
quired to answer before a grand jury" because the "Constitution does not
forbid the asking of criminative questions., 57 The Court then held that
"[a]bsent a claim of the privilege, the duty to give testimony remains ab-
solute. The stage is therefore set when the question is asked., 58
After the incriminating question is asked, the putative defendant
may assert her privilege. The grand jury then has two choices: 59 (I) It can
either make another inquiry, or (2) it "can seek a judicial determination
as to the bona fides of the witness's Fifth Amendment claim." 60 This plu-
rality holding in Mandujano supports the notion that no witness, even a
putative defendant, can quash a grand jury subpoena on the ground that
the witness will assert the Fifth Amendment: The witness must appear
and assert the privilege as to each question asked.6'
IV. APPLYING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE SUBPOENA PROCESS
If a putative defendant can be subpoenaed to a grand jury, a prose-
cutor would be allowed to subpoena such a person simply to get her to
52. 425 U.S. 564, 572 (1976) (plurality opinion).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 573.
56. Id. at 574 (citing United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 10 n.8 (1973) (alterations in origi-
nal)).
57. Id. (citing United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 433 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
58. Id. at 575.
59. Id.
60. Id. (citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1964); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S.
479, 486-487 (1951)).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Pilnick, 267 F. Supp. 791, 798-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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invoke the privilege in front of the grand jury prior to her indictment.
This is not supposed to happen, according to the handbook given to each
grand juror.62 Yet, because prosecutors wield so much power over the
process, one could certainly subpoena a defendant that the government
aims to indict, even if the prosecutor knew that she would invoke the
Fifth Amendment. By doing so, the prosecutor could make the putative
defendant travel hundreds or even thousands of miles. If permissible in
the lone case, prosecutors could start handing out such subpoenas with
regularity, perhaps even deciding to do so in all cases.
This procedure would strike the indigent the hardest, because they
might be more likely to collect contempt charges for failing to appear at
such hearings, particularly if these hearings are far from home. In addi-
tion, since these putative defendants have no right to counsel at the grand
jury, it is unlikely anyone would inform them of their rights to potential
immunity or duties to appear before the grand jury.
A federal court should disapprove of prosecutors issuing subpoenas
to putative federal defendants, just as several state courts have found
such action inappropriate in their jurisdictions.6 3 Although the holding in
62. See, e.g., ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, HANDBOOK FOR FEDERAL GRAND
JURORS, HB-I01, 9 (1999), which instructs as follows:
Normally, neither the person under investigation (sometimes referred to as the "accused,"
although this does not imply he or she is guilty of any crime) nor any witness on the ac-
cused's behalf will testify before the grand jury.
Upon request, preferably in writing, an accused may be given the opportunity by the
grand jury to appear before it. An accused who does so appear cannot be forced to testify
because of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. If the grand jury at-
tempts to force the accused to testify, an indictment returned against that person may be
nullified.
Because the appearance of an accused before the grand jury may raise complicated
legal problems, a grand jury that desires to request or to permit an accused to appear be-
fore it should consult with the United States Attorney and, if necessary, the court before
proceeding.
63. See E. LeFevre, Annotation, Privilege Against Self-Incrimination as to Testimony Before
Grand Jury, 38 A.L.R.2d 225, §4 (1954) ("[W]here a grand jury investigation is directed against a
particular person in such a way that, as to [the grand jury], he stands in the status of a defendant in
an ordinary criminal trial, then his constitutional privilege has the effect of preventing his being
called to take the witness stand at all."); Commonwealth v. Kilgallen, 108 A.2d 780 (Pa. 1954); New
York v. Luckman, 297 N.Y.S. 616 (1937); New York v. Bermel, 128 N.Y.S. 524 (1911) ("[l]f a
person testifying is a mere witness, he must claim his privilege on the ground that his answers will
incriminate him, whereas, if he be in fact the party proceeded against, he cannot be subpoenaed and
sworn, even though he claim no privilege."); Boone v. Illinois, 36 N.E. 99, 101 (1894) (where a
target was forced to take the stand "[a] right of the highest character was violated. A privilege
sacredly guaranteed by the constitution was disregarded, and a dangerous innovation on the uniform
practice in this state made."); Minnesota v. Froiseth, 16 Minn. 296 (1871). But see United States v.
Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 179 n.8 (1977) (Burger, C.J.) (obiter dictum) ("There is no constitutional pro-
hibition against summoning potential defendants to testify before a grand jury.") (citing Dionisio,
410 U.S. at 10 n.8; Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 584 n.9).
[Vol. 28:239
Misuse of the Grand Jury
Mandujano may support the proposition that a subpoena cannot be
quashed by a person on the ground that she is a present or future target of
the investigation,64 the case does not detract from the vast support for the
notion that the remedy to such prosecutorial misconduct, particularly if it
occurs with regularity, must be dismissal of the indictment without
prejudice.
A. The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Applied to the Federal Grand Jury
Grand jury testimony has been described as a "grinding routine. 65
But, when a suspect testifies, "the grand jury sit[s] up and take[s] no-
tice. ' '66 Grand juries are very interested in hearing from the actual defen-
dant.67 If the grand jury thinks that a suspect is being candid, the sus-
pect's candor "can make the difference., 68 Conversely, if a grand juror
thinks a defendant is less than forthcoming, this failure to testify can also
make the difference.
If courts allow inquisitorial methods to seep into our justice system,
the foundations of our constitutionally based criminal justice system are
impermissibly violated. The justice system in the Anglo-American tradi-
tion has been "accusatorial as opposed to . inquisitorial . . . since it
freed itself from practices borrowed by the Star Chamber from the Con-
tinent., 69 This alteration from inquisitorial to accusatorial was enshrined
in America by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
a privilege that protects the guilty and the innocent alike by banishing
practices such as England's powerful Star Chamber Court and the Span-
ish Inquisition.70 Although the legislative debate on the privilege was
64. See Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 574.
65. William Glaberson, New Trend Before Grand Juries: Meet the Accused, N.Y. TIMES, June
20, 2004, at 32.
66. According to the Chief Assistant District Attorney in Queens, John M. Ryan. Id.
67. See id. ("'Grand jurors want to hear from the officer who discharged his gun,' Stuart Lon-
don, the lawyer for both officers, said in an interview.").
68. According to Jennifer L. Ritter, a Legal Aid lawyer in Brooklyn. Id.
69. Michael Edmund O'Neill, The Fifth Amendment in Congress: Revisiting the Privilege
Against Compelled Self-Incrimination, 90 GEO. L.J. 2445, 2466 (2002) (citing Watts v. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49, 54 (1949)).
70. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 691-92 (1993). The Court stated the following:
[The Fifth Amendment Privilege] embodies principles of humanity and civil liberty,
which had been secured in the mother country only after years of struggle .... [O]ur re-
alization [is] that the privilege, while sometimes a shelter to the guilty, is often a protec-
tion to the innocent[, and that] a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to de-
pend on the confession will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses
than a system relying on independent investigation.
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limited,7 the Framers undoubtedly intended to foster the tension between
the government's power to compel "every man's evidence"72 and the
individual's constitutional right against self-incrimination. 73  In
Branzburg v. Hayes,74 the Court elaborated on this concept when it held
that in grand jury proceedings, "the public.., has a right to every man's
evidence, except for those persons protected by a constitutional, com-
mon-law, or statutory privilege. '75 As described earlier, the privilege
triggered when a putative defendant is called before the grand jury is the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.76
If a subpoena infringes upon a constitutional right, then there must
be a reasonable relationship to achieving the government's purpose. 77
For example, in Branzburg, the Court found that the State's interest justi-
fied an indirect burden on First Amendment rights.78 The Court held that
a journalist could not refuse to testify before a grand jury, because
the investigation of crime by the grand jury implements a
fundamental governmental role of securing the safety of the person
and property of the citizen, and it appears to us that calling reporters
to give testimony in the manner and for the reasons that other
citizens are called "bears a reasonable relationship to the
achievement of the governmental purpose asserted as its
justification. 79
In sum, Branzburg stands for the proposition that if a person is sub-
poenaed in a manner that indirectly infringes on a constitutional right,
namely the First Amendment, then the governmental purpose in issuing
71. See, e.g., Daniel E. Will, "Dear Diary-Can You be Used Against Me?": The Fifth
Amendment and Diaries, 35 B.C. L. REV 965, 970 (1994) ("Sparse congressional debate over adop-
tion of the Self-incrimination Clause in America, however, left unclear whether the First Congress
simply embraced the same policies that prompted the development of the self-incrimination concept
in England, or sought additional safeguards with the Self-incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.") (citing VIII JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251 at 324-35 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).
72. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (noting that constitutional, common-law,
and statutory privileges are "exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence [and] are not lightly
created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.").
73. Jerome A. Murphy, The Aftermath of the Iran-Contra Trials: The Uncertain Status of De-
rivative Use Immunity, 51 MD. L. REV. 10 11, 1050 (1992) ("[Tjhe fundamental public policy debate
[on the Fifth Amendment is] how to balance the government's interest in attaining the truth and the
individual's protection against compelled self-incrimination.").
74. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
75. Id. at 688 (citing United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950); Blackmer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932); Wigmore, supra note 70, at § 2192).
76. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
77. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 700 (1972).
78. Id.
79. Id. (quoting Bates v. Little Rock. 361 U.S. 516, 525 (1960)).
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this subpoena must have a "reasonable relationship to the achievement of
the governmental purpose asserted as its justification."'
When the reasoning in Branzburg is applied to a situation where a
prosecutor calls a putative defendant with knowledge that this defendant
will simply invoke her constitutional rights, it becomes clear that such an
action fails to "bear[] a reasonable relationship to the achievement of the
governmental purpose asserted as its justification."81 If the government
has a legitimate interest in investigating and prosecuting a crime by call-
ing a defendant before a tribunal to highlight the defendant's choice to
invoke the privilege against self-incrimination, then calling such a defen-
dant before a grand jury would be allowed, even when the prosecutor
knows the defendant will invoke their privilege. But there is no such le-
gitimate interest in underlining, and thus undermining, a person's exer-
cise of their Fifth Amendment rights. The government has long been
prohibited from drawing the fact finder's attention to the defendant's
failure to testify after invoking the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly declared that "prosecutorial comment relating to a
defendant's insistence on his right to remain silent generally constitutes
reversible error., 82 A jury cannot even be instructed that an adverse in-
ference can be made about a witness's credibility when the witness in-
voked the privilege before a grand jury but later testified at trial and indi-
cated innocence.83
There is further support for limiting the government's ability to call
putative defendants to a grand jury where they know the defendants will
invoke their right to remain silent. As discussed before, prosecutors gain
great power from their association with grand juries.84 As the Court held
in United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 5 "if grand juries are to be
granted extraordinary powers of investigation because of the difficulty
and importance of their task, the use of those powers ought to be limited
80. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 700.
81. Id.
82. Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 288 (1986); see also Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609, 615 (1965); Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. 1, 9 (1961). In Johnson v. United States,
318 U.S. 189 (1943), Justice Douglas wrote of the Fifth Amendment privilege as follows:
If the privilege claimed by the witness be allowed, the matter is at an end. The claim of
privilege and its allowance is properly no part of the evidence submitted to the jury, and
no inferences whatever can be legitimately drawn by them from the legal assertion by the
witness of his constitutional right. The allowance of the privilege would be a mockery of
justice, if either party is to be affected injuriously by it.
Id. at 196-97 (quoting Phelin v. Kenderdine, 20 Pa. 354, 363 (1853)).
83. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 423-24 (1957).
84. See supra Part I.A.
85. 463 U.S. 418 (1983).
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as far as reasonably possible to the accomplishments of the task. '86 If the
task is to investigate a crime, nothing is gained by calling a putative de-
fendant and forcing her to invoke her privilege, unless the prosecutor
prays for undue prejudice to come from this testimony (or lack of testi-
mony). A prosecutor may hope to add a charge of contempt for the de-
fendant who invariably fails to appear, thereby improving the govern-
ment's bargaining position when it comes time to plea bargain before
trial.87
But, just as a witness should not be placed on the stand for the pur-
pose of exercising her Fifth Amendment privilege before the petit jury,88
a putative defendant should not be placed before a grand jury for the
purpose of exercising the same privilege. When a prosecutor calls a co-
defendant of the accused at trial to elicit an assertion of the privilege, this
codefendant is indirectly, yet improperly, denied her constitutionally
guaranteed right to remain silent. 89 A putative defendant who is forced
to exercise this right is also indirectly, yet improperly, denied this consti-
tutional right. The former case is exemplified by the Florida District
Court of Appeals case, Hankerson v. State, where the court reasoned that
the codefendant's testimony would force the defendant to testify in order
to counter any assumption made by the jury that because the defendant
refused to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds the defendant is guilty as
well. 90
Some United States Supreme Court obiter dictum supports the no-
tion that a prosecutor should not have the leeway to potentially taint
grand jurors where no benefit could be gained.91 In United States v. R.
Enterprises,92 the Court held that "[a] grand jury investigation 'is not
86. Id. at 434-35.
87. Hope Viner Sambom, The Vanishing Trial, A.B.A.J., Oct. 2003, at 24, 27 (asserting that
plea bargaining seems to have become a near requirement for overloaded prosecutors in recent years,
as 62% of defendants pleaded guilty and waived trial in the 1970s, versus 85% in 2001).
88. See Commonwealth v. Champney, 832 A.2d 403, 455 (Pa. 2003) (citing Commonwealth v.
Greene, 285 A.2d 865, 867 (Pa. 1971); United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 321 (1992) (holding
that a witness who properly invokes the privilege against self-incrimination and refuses to testify is
therefore unavailable to the defense as a witness)).
89. Hankerson v. State, 347 So. 2d 744 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
90. In Hankerson, the court opined as follows:
There can be little doubt that when an admittedly implicated witness takes the Fifth
Amendment in front of the jury, the defendant, then before the court, is prejudiced in the
eyes of said jury, which may, not surprisingly, conclude that both are guilty. In such
event, it would appear that the defendant has indirectly lost his basic right to remain silent
and not have his failure to take the stand cast up before the jury.
Id. at 745.
91. See, e.g., United States v. R. Enters., 498 U.S. 292 (1991).
92. Id.
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fully carried out until every available clue has been run down and all
witnesses examined in every proper way to find if a crime has been
committed."' 93 The Court continued that "[r]equiring the Government to
explain in too much detail the particular reasons underlying a subpoena
threatens to compromise 'the indispensable secrecy of grand jury pro-
ceedings."'' 94 R. Enterprises supports Mandujano by suggesting that al-
lowing putative defendants to challenge a grand jury subpoena may
threaten to compromise grand jury secrecy.95 However, where a defen-
dant, who has already been arrested and is simply waiting for indictment,
has indicated she will invoke her Fifth Amendment right before the
grand jury, the government cannot reasonably argue that proffering a
reason for calling this defendant will jeopardize the grand jury secrecy.
Quite simply, this action would go beyond "run[ing] down . . . all wit-
nesses ... in every proper way, ' 96 and instead would appear as an arbi-
trary fishing expedition, or a prosecutor's decision to select a target out
of malice or with an intent to harass.
Furthermore, there is no necessity to argue for the remedy sought in
R. Enterprises, namely the idea of allowing a grand jury subpoena to be
challenged. 97 The remedy I propose is not to challenge a grand jury sub-
poena, but simply that the indictment should be dismissed without preju-
dice. This dismissal should occur when a prosecutor calls a putative de-
fendant knowing she will assert her Fifth Amendment privilege, and then
the defendant is later indicted. In such a case, the grand jury secrecy
would not be compromised by allowing the concurrent examination of
the prosecutor's arguably impermissible exercise of discretion, but would
simply provide a warning to prosecutors to prevent them from abusing
the immense, discretionary subpoena power that they wield.
The Supreme Court has made explicitly clear that neither a prosecu-
tor nor a self-motivated grand jury has such license.98 The R. Enterprises
Court held that "[g]rand juries are not licensed to engage in arbitrary
fishing expeditions, nor may they select targets of investigation out of
malice or intent to harass." 99 Thus, the Court, deciding to "fashion an
appropriate standard of reasonableness,"' 00 held that "a court may be jus-
93. Id. at 297 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 701 (1972)).
94. Id. at 299 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513 (1943)).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 297.
97. In R. Enterprises, the defendant sought to quash a subpoena duces tecum. Id. at 295.
98. Id. at 299.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 300 ("Our task is to fashion an appropriate standard of reasonableness, one that
gives due weight to the difficult position of subpoena recipients but does not impair the strong gov-
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tified in a case where unreasonableness is alleged in requiring the Gov-
ernment to reveal the general subject of the grand jury's investigation
before requiring the challenging party to carry its burden of persua-
sion."' 0' Although R. Enterprises concerned a motion to quash a sub-
poena decus tecum and not a motion to dismiss an indictment, the Court
provided some guidance when holding that "a district court may require
that the Government reveal the subject of the investigation to the trial
court in camera, so that the court may determine whether the motion to
quash has a reasonable prospect for success before it discloses the sub-
ject matter to the challenging party."' 0 2 Analogous to this standard, while
the government is free to subpoena anyone to the grand jury, including
putative defendants who will invoke their privilege, the government
should be required to proffer, in camera, a reason to overcome the pre-
sumption that these putative defendants should not be subpoenaed to the
grand jury.
B. Remedy for Fifth Amendment Violations Before a Grand Jury:
Dismissal Without Prejudice
The Court will not force compulsion, which would override consti-
tutional rights, but what is the appropriate remedy? I do not suggest that
a defendant can challenge an indictment because the evidence presented
to the grand jury was not reliable or sufficient-an approach disallowed
by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Williams.' °3 But
the Williams Court, while not finding a prosecutorial duty to present ex-
culpatory evidence to the grand jury, did note that "the grand jury cannot
compel the appearance of witnesses and the production of evidence, and
must appeal to the court when such compulsion is required."' 4 More
importantly, the Williams Court stated "the court will refuse to lend its
assistance when the compulsion the grand jury seeks would override
ernmental interests in affording grand juries wide latitude, avoiding minitrials on peripheral matters,
and preserving a necessary level of secrecy.").
101. Id. at 302.
102. Id. (italics in original).
103. Justice Scalia wrote of this challenge to the grand jury as follows:
We accepted Justice Nelson's description in Costello v. United States, where we held that
"[i]t would run counter to the whole history of the grand jury institution" to permit an in-
dictment to be challenged "on the ground that there was inadequate or incompetent evi-
dence before the grand jury." . . . Review of facially valid indictments on such grounds
"would run counter to the whole history of the grand jury institution [] [and] [n]either
justice nor the concept of a fair trial requires [it]."
United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 54-55 (1992) (alterations in original) (citations omitted)
(quoting Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1956)).
104. Williams, 504 U.S. at 48 (citing Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41,49 (1959)).
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rights accorded by the Constitution'0 5 or testimonial privileges recog-
nized by the common law."' 0 6 The five-member majority in Williams
explained that "[w]e have twice suggested, though not held, that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach when an individual is
summoned to appear before a grand jury, even if he is the subject of the
investigation."' 7 Although it might be advisable, I do not propose that a
Sixth Amendment right to counsel attach for all targets of investigation. I
simply suggest that a prosecutor violates his duty when he calls a puta-
tive defendant to the grand jury, knowing that she will invoke her rights
and no immunity will be offered. Four members of the Williams Court, in
dissent, described the federal prosecutor's duty in the following terms:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all;
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done .... [A federal prose-
cutor] may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should
do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to
strike foul ones. It is as much [a federal prosecutor's] duty to refrain
from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction
as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.,8
The Williams dissenters followed this assertion by finding that "[i]t
is equally clear that the prosecutor has the same duty to refrain from im-
proper methods calculated to produce a wrongful indictment."' 0 9 In de-
termining a solution to prosecutorial misconduct, the Court concluded
that "[u]nrestrained prosecutorial misconduct in grand jury proceedings
is inconsistent with the administration of justice in the federal courts and
should be redressed in appropriate cases by the dismissal of indictments
obtained by improper methods."'" 0 With three justices who had signed
the pertinent part of the Williams dissent remaining on the Court,"' and
with the addition of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, when faced with the
105. Id. (citing Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972)).
106. Id. (citing In re Grand Jury Investigation of Hugle, 754 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1985)).
107. Id. at 49 (citing United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976); In re Groban, 352
U.S. 330, 333, (1957)).
108. Id. at 62 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88
(1935)).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 69 n.12 (noting further that "even the Solicitor General [acknowledges] that unre-
strained prosecutorial misconduct in grand jury proceedings 'could so subvert the integrity of the
grand jury process as to justify judicial intervention."') (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154,
164-71 (1978))).
Ill. Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Thomas. Id. at 55.
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question of whether subpoenaing a putative defendant with knowledge
that the defendant will assert her Fifth Amendment rights constitutes
prosecutorial misconduct, a modem Court might find misconduct and
thus approve the dismissal of the indictment, without prejudice, to en-
courage the government to avoid such actions in the future.
1. Hubbell Establishes the Rule of Dismissal Without Prejudice
Knowing that a putative defendant will assert her Fifth Amendment
rights, when a prosecutor forces her to assert her privilege against self-
incrimination before the grand jury responsible for the indictment, the
United States Supreme Court suggested the appropriate remedy is dis-
missal without prejudice.' 12 In United States v. Hubbell, the Court dis-
missed the indictment upon finding that Hubbell's privilege had been
violated when he was compelled to produce evidence that "could provide
a prosecutor with a 'lead to incriminating evidence,' or 'a link in the
chain of evidence needed to prosecute.'" 1 3
In 1994, Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr was "appointed... to
investigate possible violations of federal law relating to the Whitewater
Development Corporation."' 14 In December of that year, Starr secured a
cooperation agreement from Webster Hubbell. Hubbell "[plead] guilty to
charges of mail fraud and tax evasion arising out of his billing practices
as a member of an Arkansas law firm from 1989 to 1992, and was sen-
tenced to twenty-one months in prison."' 5 When the prosecution of
President Bill Clinton stalled, Starr wanted to see if Hubbell had fulfilled
his promise to give "'full, complete, accurate, and truthful information'
about matters relating to the Whitewater investigation. '11 6 To that end,
Starr subpoenaed a broad swath of personal papers from Hubbell. '17
The Court found that Hubbell in fact provided materials which led
to incriminating evidence and provided a link in the chain of the evi-
112. U.S. v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
113. The Hubbell court concluded the following:
Entirely apart from the contents of the 13,120 pages of materials that respondent pro-
duced in this case, it is undeniable that providing a catalog of existing documents fitting
within any of the 11 broadly worded subpoena categories could provide a prosecutor with
a "lead to incriminating evidence," or "a link in the chain of evidence needed to prose-
cute."
Id. at 42.
114. Id. at 30.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 30-31.
117. Id. at 46-49.
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dence needed to prosecute.' 8 Because the government violated Hub-
bell's privilege under the Fifth Amendment, the indictment garnered
from this violation was dismissed without prejudice." 9 Following this
ruling, the government was still constrained from bringing charges unless
it could prove that indictment was based upon evidence that was ob-
tained independent of Hubbell's immunized testimony related to the
documents he provided. 20
Extrapolating from Hubbell, if the government violates a person's
privilege against self-incrimination before a grand jury, the proper rem-
edy consists of (1) a dismissal without prejudice and (2) an admonish-
ment to the government that if it chooses to proceed with the indictment,
it must not use the tainted evidence or the tainted procedure (namely the
calling of a putative defendant before the grand jury to force her to in-
voke her Fifth Amendment right).
2. Applying this Rule Beyond Wealthy Suspects
The holding in Hubbell will be widely utilized by defendants with
the wealth to have access to legal counsel any time they are called before
a grand jury. Those who have "lawyered-up" will, like Hubbell, file a
motion to quash their appearance based upon a pending violation of their
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Unlike the plaintiff in
R. Enterprises,'21 these putative defendants have some chance of success.
A putative defendant advised by counsel will clearly communicate
whether or not she desires to testify before a grand jury, often including a
specific answer as to whether she plans to invoke her privilege if called.
Most defendants will not have this ability. The typical criminal defendant
118. Id. at 42-43. However, in cases besides Hubbell, the Court has held that is not necessary
that a person prove that the evidence requested by the government would "provide a prosecutor with
a 'lead to incriminating evidence' or 'a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute," only that
such an answer could do so. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55
(holding that the privilege is "sometimes 'a shelter to the guilty,' [but it] is often 'a protection to the
innocent'); see also Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 19 (2001) (citing Hoffman v. United States, 341
U.S. 479, 486 (1951)):
[T]his privilege not only extends to answers that would in themselves support a convic-
tion ... but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence
needed to prosecute the claimant .... [I]t need only be evident from the implications of
the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question
or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious
disclosure could result.
Reiner, 532 U.S. at 20-21 (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted).
119. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 46.
120. Id. at 45.
121. See supra notes 97-109 and accompanying text.
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is indigent, 122 and those without counsel are most easily exploited in a
manner that mocks the ideal behind the phrase "Equal Justice Under
Law" inscribed on the fagade of the United State Supreme Court build-
ing's west pediment. 23
The Supreme Court announced the expansion of the right to counsel
in Gideon v. Wainwright124 with the following declaration: "From the
very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid
great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to as-
sure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands
equal before the law."' 125 In Miranda v. Arizona,126 the Court further elu-
cidated the relationship between a defendant's Fifth Amendment's rights
and his ability to secure counsel. The Court held the following:
The financial ability of the individual has no relationship to the
scope of the rights involved here. The privilege against self-
incrimination secured by the Constitution applies to all individuals..
• .While authorities are not required to relieve the accused of his
poverty, they have the obligation not to take advantage of indigence
in the administration of justice. Denial of counsel to the indigent at
the time of interrogation while allowing an attorney to those who
can afford one would be no more supportable by reason or logic
than the similar situation at trial and on appeal struck down in
Gideon v. Wainwright and Douglas v. California. 127
Treating defendants differently based upon their financial status
does not allow individuals to stand equally before the law with those
with the means to obtain counsel. 2 8 In Miranda, the Court prescribed the
method police must use to provide constitutional warning, making no
distinction between a Martha Stewart and a Joe Public.' 29 When the po-
lice read a suspect her Miranda rights and she invoked her privilege to
remain silent, her request must be noted and further police questioning
122. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, 107 Yale L.J. 1, 7 n.7 (1997) (by 1992, eighty percent of those accused of state felonies were
indigent) (citing STEVEN K. SMITH & CAROL J. DEFRANCES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, INDIGENT DEFENSE 1, 4 (Feb. 1996).
123. Aaron M. Clemens, Removing the Market for Lying Snitches: Reforms to Prevent Unjust
Convictions, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 151, 221 (2004).
124. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
125. Id. at 344.
126. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
127. Id. at 472-73 (citations omitted) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963);
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must cease unless she approaches the government' 30 to knowingly, intel-
ligently, and voluntarily waive the privilege.' 31 Further, once a suspect is
arrested, she is assigned a defense attorney to protect her rights, 32 whom
the prosecutor must approach instead of directly contacting the repre-
sented party. 133
Even if a prosecutor does not have actual knowledge of a defen-
dant's previous invocation of her Fifth Amendment privilege, such
knowledge could be imputed to the prosecutor.' 34 Such imputed knowl-
edge, combined with a presumption that most defendants will invoke
their Fifth Amendment privilege at some point, render it unreasonable
for a prosecutor to expect a putative defendant to provide testimony. Ad-
ditionally, if operating ethically, a prosecutor calling a grand jury must
have the belief that the targeted person is involved in a crime and will
soon need an attorney. Finally, a prosecutor should know that an unrep-
resented person, as a putative defendant, has not properly waived her
privilege.
Because a waiver of a constitutional right should not be lightly in-
ferred, 135 a putative defendant should not be brought before a grand jury
unless she has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her right
to invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege. In Smith, the United States
Supreme Court found it desirable to reserve the term 'waiver' of the
privilege for cases by which one affirmatively renounces the protection
of the privilege. 36 Therefore, if a prosecutor has or should have knowl-
edge that an unrepresented putative defendant does not want to testify,
this assertion of her right should raise the same concerns that exist where
a wealthy defendant with advice of coulsel has formally notified the
government of her intention to invoke the F h Amendment. Thus, if any
person is indicted after having been called b ore the grand jury and in-
voking her Fifth Amendment right where the .rosecutor had or should
have had knowledge of the person's desire to invoke the privilege, the
indictment should be dismissed without prejudice.
130. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).
131. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1983) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (plurality opinion).
132. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 484-85 (1964).
133. Jacqueline E. Ross, Valuing Inside Knowledge: Police Infiltration as a Problem for the
Law of Evidence, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1111, 1123 (2004) (noting that "codes of professional re-
sponsibility ... limit prosecutors' contacts with represented parties ... .
134. See sources cited supra note 51.
135. Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 150 (1949).
136. Id. at 151.
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Because of the potential for prejudice, an indictment must be dis-
missed if it was handed down by a grand jury that personally observed
the subject of the indictment invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and the subject had previously informed the
government of her intent to invoke the privilege. Any invocation of the
privilege by the putative defendant should be presented solely, out of
view of the grand jurors, and before the grand jurors are told that the
suspect is coming to testify.
Support is found in the final report issued by the District of Colum-
bia Grand Jury Committee. 137 The Committee cited two of my main rea-
sons for supporting the conclusion in their report. First, they found that
forcing a putative defendant to invoke her privilege in front of the grand
jury would "[undermine] the Fifth Amendment privilege [by raising] the
presumption of guilt in the grand jurors' minds."13 8 As the Committee
explained:
It is one thing for the grand jurors to hear the evidence that the
prosecution presents ... but it is quite another for the grand jurors
to watch as the target or subject invokes his Fifth Amendment privi-
lege time and time again. This process necessarily colors the grand
jurors' perception of the witness, and may create an unwarranted
presumption of guilt.139
The Committee also found that no constitutional benefit counter-
balanced this derogation of the privilege.1 40 Instead, the Committee only
found additional reasons why the practice is inappropriate. For example,
the Committee found the following:
[F]orcing a target or subject of a grand jury investigation to invoke
the Fifth Amendment privilege on the stand [who has already for-
mally indicated that he or she will not answer any questions] pre-
sent[s] an unnecessary opportunity for prosecutorial harassment[,] .
• .impose[s] an unnecessary burden on the witness[,] ... may cause
unnecessary embarrassment. . . and waste[s] grand jurors' time. 14 1
137. COUNCIL FOR COURT EXCELLENCE, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GRAND JURY STUDY COM-
MITTEE FINAL REPORT 42 (July 2001) (Recommendation 9 asserts, in part, that a witness who is the
target or subject of an investigation and who has formally indicated his intention to assert his Fifth




140. Id. at 43.
141. Id.
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With one dissent, 42  the Committee took the position that:
"[F]orcing witnesses who are also targets of a grand jury investigation to
invoke their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination on the
stand violates the spirit of the Fifth Amendment and serves no appropri-
ate purpose."' 143 This sentiment was shared by former United States At-
torney for the District of Columbia Roscoe Howard.144
We hope that such prosecutorial misconduct will not occur any-
where due to the ethical considerations that should bar prosecutors from
parading a putative defendant before a grand jury. But, if prosecutors
refuse to govern themselves, the Court must step in to correct this inap-
propriate behavior in order to achieve the court's primary goal of protect-
ing our constitutional rights. 145
142. Id. at n.60 (Judge Warren R. King dissented because Recommendation 9 was proposed by
an ad hoc committee that did not set forth "the various views that were advanced in support of, or in
opposition to" the recommendation.).
143. Id. at 43.
144. Roscoe Howard, Presentation to Georgetown Law Professor Roger Fairfax's Federal
Grand Jury Seminar (Feb. 11, 2004) (then-U.S. Attorney Howard stated that he disagreed with such
tactics).
145. Cf United States v. Laymon, 730 F. Supp. 332, 341-42 (D. Colo. 1990) where the court
opined the following:
It ill behooves a great nation to compromise or sacrifice the freedoms of its citizens as the
price of more efficient law enforcement .... Our tradition ... requires judges and police
officers, who are equally sworn to uphold the same Constitution, to enforce constitution-
ally guaranteed rights, even when their enforcement is unpopular and even when those
rights are asserted on behalf of persons whose activities are considered despicable .... As
a practical matter if we are not all free, none of us is really free, for exceptions which
deny constitutional rights to some erode them for all. While we deal today only with de-
nial of Mr. Laymon's rights, who knows which of us may be next.
A society cannot remain free or strong if it undermines its own principals. Law en-
forcement officials are not licensed to disregard the law--especially not the law en-
shrined in the Constitution.
